The Jewish Mandate of Martyrdom: Logic and Illogic in the Halakhah
Jewish law requires that a Jew shall suffer death rather than commit any of three specific, grievous transgressions. Such a stark demand should clearly apply only when there is absolutely no alternative to martyrdom, and the inescapable, and preferable, choice is sin or die. By the same token, Jewis...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
HUC
2004
|
| In: |
Hebrew Union College annual
Year: 2003, Volume: 74, Pages: 215-241 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
|
| Summary: | Jewish law requires that a Jew shall suffer death rather than commit any of three specific, grievous transgressions. Such a stark demand should clearly apply only when there is absolutely no alternative to martyrdom, and the inescapable, and preferable, choice is sin or die. By the same token, Jewish law allows Jews to break any law, except for the three, for which death is mandated, in order to escape a martyr's death. This permission seems to provide a reliable, lawful alternative for preserving one's life when the awful choice of transgress or die is presented. This paper will explore talmudic and post-talmudic statements of these halakhic provisions and examine their logical implications. It is suggested that the rules have elements in them which seriously undermine their practical utility. The demand to suffer martyrdom and the permission to transgress all but the three absolutely proscribed sins appears to be more of an inspirational slogan than a reasoned approach to desperate situations. Rhetoric has perhaps bested reason. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, Hebrew Union College annual
|