The Binding of Abraham: Levinas’s Moment in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling

Most readings of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling take its account of the Abraham and Isaac story to imply fairly obviously that duty towards God is absolutely distinct from, and therefore capable of superseding, duty towards neighbor or son. This paper will argue, however, that the Akedah, or ‘bind...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Reed, Robert Charles (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Netherlands [2017]
In: Sophia
Year: 2017, Volume: 56, Issue: 1, Pages: 81-98
IxTheo Classification:CB Christian life; spirituality
HB Old Testament
KAH Church history 1648-1913; modern history
NCB Personal ethics
TK Recent history
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Abraham
B Time-consciousness
B Ethics
B Isaac
B love of neighbor
B Kierkegaard
B Levinas
B Fear and Trembling
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
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Summary:Most readings of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling take its account of the Abraham and Isaac story to imply fairly obviously that duty towards God is absolutely distinct from, and therefore capable of superseding, duty towards neighbor or son. This paper will argue, however, that the Akedah, or ‘binding’ of Isaac, as Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio, depicts it, binds Abraham to Isaac in a revitalized neighbor relation that is not at all subordinate, in any simple way, to Abraham’s God-relation. The two relations are defined by an intimate mutual tension, a dynamic of passionate inwardness that responds to the immediate demands of the neighbor as fully as the ethics that Levinas notoriously accuses Kierkegaard of having ignored. It is also the dynamic of time consciousness, which for Levinas is fundamentally ethical. I show that Kierkegaardian faith can be viewed as the dynamic of time-consciousness transformed by passionate inwardness into one’s God-relation—that is, converted into a certain religious mode of life. The ethics corresponding to this—an ethics of neighbor love superseding the ‘social morality’ that Silentio, following Hegel, calls the ‘ethical’—would then be the same dynamic of time-consciousness transformed by passionate inwardness into one’s neighbor-relation. The key to the argument is seeing the need to substitute for the spatial dichotomy ‘interior/exterior,’ which results in so much trouble when comparing Levinas and Kierkegaard, the temporal contraries ‘giving up’ and ‘getting back.’
ISSN:1873-930X
Contains:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-015-0496-7